

## Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 IO-12 ADP-00 PM-09 AEC-11 AF-10

ARA-11 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-02 INR-09 L-03 NASA-04

NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-10 OIC-04 OST-04 PA-03 PRS-01

RSC-01 GAC-01 SCI-06 SS-14 MBFR-03 USIA-12 SAJ-01

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EUR/ WE: CJOHNSON

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R 232255 Z MAR 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION GENEVA

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION NATO

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DISTO

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, IT

SUBJECT: ITALIAN VIEWS ON CW ARMS CONTROL

1. COUNSELOR OF ITALIAN EMBASSY ( SALIMEI) CALLED ON ACDA  
OFFICER TO CONSULT ON VIEWS WHICH ROME BELIEVES ITALIAN  
CCD REP SHOULD EXPRESS IN SPEECH AT CCD IN EARLY APRIL.

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IN BRIEF, ITALIANS FAVORED COMPREHENSIVE CW PROHIBITIONS BUT APPRECIATED COMPLEXITY OF VERIFICATION PROBLEM. THEY COULD THEREFORE SUPPORT A "GRADUAL" APPROACH PROVIDED AN INITIAL TREATY DEALT WITH DESTRUCTION OF STOCKPILES. ITALIAN SPEECH WOULD ALSO SAY THAT A PARTIAL APPROACH LIMITED TO A CW PRODUCTION BAN "WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE". SALIMEI EXPLAINED THAT A PARTIAL APPROACH WHICH DID NOT PROVIDE FOR DESTRUCTION OR "NEUTRALIZATION" OF STOCKPILES WOULD BE "WITHOUT RECIPROCITY" SINCE COUNTRIES THAT ARE ALREADY "CHEMICALLY DISARMED" WOULD LOSE THE OPTION TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS WHILE OTHERS RETAINED THEIR STOCKPILES.

2. ACDA OFFICER EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT ON ITALIAN IDEAS. HE SAID USG HAD CONTINUED ITS INTENSIVE STUDIES OF CW ARMS CONTROL PROBLEM. HE COULD NOT SAY WHETHER OR WHEN USG WOULD ADOPT SPECIFIC OR

DEFINITE APPROACHES ON CW, BUT IT WAS POSSIBLE WE MIGHT BE IN A POSITION TO DISCUSS SOME DETAILED IDEAS WITH ITALIAN OFFICIALS IN NEAR FUTURE. ACDA OFFICER ALSO COULD NOT SAY WHICH OF A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS WOULD BE OUR PREFERRED COURSE. HE NONETHELESS WISHED TO MAKE SOME GENERAL COMMENTS ABOUT A POSSIBLE PRODUCTION BAN.

3. ACDA OFFICER EXPLAINED THAT IN THEIR STUDIES US EXPERTS HAD BEEN VERY CONSCIOUS OF DESIRABILITY OF SEEKING TO ACHIEVE FAIR AND BALANCED OBLIGATIONS. HOWEVER, QUESTION OF "RECIPROCITY" OR BALANCE COULD NOT BE VIEWED EXCLUSIVELY IN TERMS DESCRIBED BY SALIMEI. ANY POSSIBLE TREATY IN THIS FIELD WOULD CONTAIN MANY PROVISIONS BESIDES THOSE AFFECTING PRODUCTION. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WOULD BE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS AND IT WOULD BE RELEVANT TO EXAMINE WHETHER THESE HAD EQUAL IMPACT ON ALL PARTIES. (HE NOTED THAT IN NPT IT HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO HAVE DIFFERENT VERIFICATION OBLIGATIONS FOR NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR PARTIES.) ALSO, THERE WOULD BE WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS WHICH MIGHT SERVE AS EQUAL PROTECTION FOR ALL PARTIES. BUT PERHAPS OF MOST SIGNIFICANCE, ONE COULD NOT ASSESS A CONCEIVABLE PRODUCTION BAN ONLY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ITS IMPACT ON COUNTRIES NOT PRODUCING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. VIEWED FROM PERSPECTIVE OF COUNTRIES, LIKE US

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AND USSR, WHICH HAD INVESTED SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT AND

TECHNOLOGY IN PAST PRODUCTION, IT MIGHT BE SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE GIVING UP MORE THAN NON- CHEMICAL COUNTRIES BY A CONCEIVABLE PRODUCTION BAN IN THE SENSE THAT THEY HAD GREATER EXISTING CAPABILITY ACTUALLY TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS; AND THIS FACTOR WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN ASSESSING WHAT MIGHT BE A FAIR BALANCE.

4. ACDA OFFICER STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT IN HIS OPINION MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR WOULD BE ASSESSMENT OF WHAT WAS IN GENUINE SECURITY INTERESTS, NOT ONLY OF US, BUT OF ITS ALLIES AS WELL. HE FELT CONFIDENT THAT IF US ADOPTED A SPECIFIC APPROACH IT WOULD DO SO IN BELIEF THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD FURTHER OUR MUTUAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN EUROPE. THIS WAS ADMITTEDLY COMPLEX AND SENSITIVE QUESTION. WE HAD NOT, HOWEVER, YET HAD OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE ASPECTS IN DEPTH WITH OUR ITALIAN FRIENDS AND OTHER ALLIES.

5. FOR ALL OF ABOVE REASONS, ACDA OFFICER CONCLUDED BY REQUESTING THAT ITALIANS HOLD BACK FROM EXPRESSING JUDGMENT IN THEIR FORTHCOMING CCD SPEECH THAT ANY

PARTICULAR PARTIAL APPROACH WOULD BE " NOT ACCEPTABLE". HE STRESSED THAT THIS WAS NOT A REQUEST THAT ITALIAN OFFICIALS SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CHANGE THEIR MINDS AND ABANDON THEIR PREFERENCE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, OR APPROVE ANY PARTICULAR PARTIAL APPROACH, BUT MERELY THAT THEY RESERVE JUDGMENT PENDING AN OPPORTUNITY, WHICH MIGHT COME IN THE NEAR FUTURE, TO DISCUSS THE ENTIRE MATTER WITH US IN DEPTH. SALIMEI SAID THIS SOUNDED LIKE A VERY REASONABLE REQUEST AND HE WOULD FORWARD IT TO ROME. ( AFTER CONVERSATION, ACDA OFFICER TELEPHONED SALIMEI TO SAY HE HAD REPORTED CONVERSATION TO ACDA ACTING DIRECTOR FARLEY WHO HAD AUTHORIZED HIM TO CONFIRM THE REQUEST IN HIS NAME THAT ITALIANS HOLD OFF FROM EXPRESSING JUDGMENT THAT ANY PARTICULAR PARTIAL APPROACH WOULD BE NOT ACCEPTABLE.)

6. SALIMEI SAID THAT ITALIAN REPS IN SOME OTHER NATO CAPITALS MIGHT BE DISCUSSING PROPOSED ITALIAN CCD STATEMENT WITH VARIOUS FONOFF OFFICIALS. HE DID NOT KNOW

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( OR DID NOT CHOOSE TO SAY) IN WHICH CAPITALS. SHOULD ANY OF INFO ADDRESSEES LEARN OF SUCH ITALIAN CONVERSATIONS WE WOULD WELCOME PROMPT REPORTS.

7. FOR GENEVA

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\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* SECRET

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ROME  
THE HAGUE  
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